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“Wealth in itself -says Cantillon (1755, Ch.I)- is nothing but the Maintenance, 
Conveniences, and Superfluities of life”. This definition, which is conspicuously 
quoted in two equally approving footnotes to a famous passage by Smith both in 
Cannan’s and in Campbell and Skinner’s editions of the Wealth of Nations (1776, 
Bk.I, Ch.V, n.1), is crucial in a number of senses. One is that, according to this 
definition, ‘wealth in itself’ is made up of goods and not of money. The other is that 
the goods of which wealth consists are final rather than instrumental goods. Still 
another is that wealth is a flow of final goods rather than a stock of instrumental 
goods. Since, however, the meaning of this term has changed over time and since it 
is wealth that is said to be produced, distributed and consumed in the titles and 
contents of most treatises of political economy from, say, Turgot (1766) to J.S.Mill 
(1871), it is worthwhile to go deeper into Cantillon’s definition for this paves the way 
for the notion of wealth that prevailed in classical political economy since Adam 
Smith. 
 
GOODS VS. MONEY 
All know, says J.S.Mill (1871, Vol. I, p.3), that “the questions how a nation is 
made wealthy, and how it is made free, or virtuous, or eminent in literature, in the fine 
arts, in arms, or in polity, are totally distinct enquiries”. But, he continues, some 
“theorists and practical politicians have been equally and at one period universally 
infected” by a “mischievous confusion of ideas” on the question concerning “what is 
to be considered as wealth”. The fault of these theorists (the Mercantilists) was to 
confuse, he argues, wealth with money. Not that this confusion was the result of a 
conceited terminology for, as Smith himself pointed out, “that wealth consists in 
money, or in gold and silver, is a popular notion” to the extent that “the great affair, 
we always find, is to get money” (Smith, 1776, Bk. IV, Ch.I). The fact is that the 
Mercantilists’ identification of wealth with money, and of money with precious metals, 
was instrumental to, or associated with, their central belief that, the world amount of 
these metals being given at a given moment, the only way for a nation to become 
richer was to make another nation poorer. Thus Mill’s argument highlights what 
Schumpeter calls a “standard topic in the historiography of economics” (1954, p. 
361). This topic is due to Adam Smith. For it was Smith who first provided a 
systematic examination of the negative consequences of the Mercantilists’ initial 
confusion (1776, Bk. IV) as well as a positive theory of how the “necessaries, 
conveniences and amusements of human life” available in a nation can grow along 
with those of other nations. In this connection Schumpeter’s argument that Smith’s 
criticism of the Mercantile system is “unintelligent” on the grounds that even in the 
age of Mercantilism wealth was at times regarded as goods rather than as money is 
untenable. For Schumpeter seems to ignore, beyond the textual evidence he 
provides, the analytical foundations of Mercantilism (which is based on the principle 
that one nation’s gain must be another nation’s loss) and, with a stronger reason, the 
countervailing foundations of Smith’s system of thought which is rather based on the 
notion that one nation’s gain is compatible with, and may indeed be strengthened by, 
another nation’s gain if only the principles of capital and competition were known and 
practiced in all nations. 
 
INDIVIDUAL VS. NATIONAL WEALTH 
The proposition that one nation’s gain must be another nation’s loss is the 
consequence of a still deeper confusion. This concerns the nature and causes of the 
wealth of an individual as distinct from the nature and causes of the wealth of the 
whole society (Smith, 1776; Lauderdale, 1804; and others). While saying that 
Mercantilists “felt it was nice for a nation as well as for individuals to have money -
and said so without thinking any more about it”, Schumpeter (1954, p. 344) implicitly 
denies his own critique of Smith’s criticism of the Mercantile system. For Smith knew 
very well that “the great affair is to get money” and devoted to this affair much more 
thought than all Mercantilists put together in, to begin with, Book II of the Wealth of 
Nations. Here money is considered in the light of the theory of capital while capital is 
studied in the light of the distinction between the ‘stock which a man possesses’ and 
the ‘general stock of any country or society’. “In the wealth of mankind, says in this 
connection J. S. Mill (1871, p. 8), nothing is included which does not of itself answer 
some purpose of utility or pleasure. To an individual anything is wealth which, though 
useless in itself, enables him to claim from others a part of their stock of things useful 
or pleasant”. The great affair of mankind, therefore, is to get (to produce) the goods 
rather than the money by which they are circulated from one individual to another. 
That the notion of wealth is strictly connected with the idea of production is as 
unclear in Cantillon’s definition as it is clear in Smith’s implicit use of it. For, to begin 
with, Smith’s opening statement of the Wealth of Nations that “the annual labour of 
every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the necessaries and 
conveniences of life which it annually consumes” cannot apply to those necessaries 
and conveniences which are given by nature (and which are actually included in 
Cantillon’s definition). This question was cleared up by Say (1843) through his 
distinction between richesses naturelles and richesses sociales: while the former 
comprise only the goods given by nature, the latter refer to the goods available only 
on condition that some labour be spent on their production. The idea of property (and 
therefore of exchange value) is associated with the latter, not with the former, form of 
wealth. Say’s practical conclusion comes therefore to coincide with Smith’s starting 
point: the subject of political economy is not ‘wealth in itself’ but only that large and 
growing part of it which requires to be produced by labour. Thus wealth is most 
properly defined as ‘all useful or agreeable things except those which can be 
obtained, in the quantity desired, without labour or sacrifice’ (J.S.Mill, 1871, p.10; see 
also McCulloch, 1864; Senior, 1836; Torrens, 1821; and others). The only 
qualification worth adding to this definition is that the ‘necessaries, conveniences and 
amusements’ which result from the application of labour, and which therefore 
constitute wealth as the subject of political economy, need not consist, unlike what is 
assumed in Malthus’s definition (Malthus, 1827, p. 234), of material objects. For the 
element of utility (or desirability), which is essential to all articles of wealth (Senior, 
1836; Say, 1843), belongs also to services (whether provided by durable goods or by 
labour itself). 
FINAL VS. INSTRUMENTAL GOODS 
Whether wealth is considered ‘in itself’ or as the result of human exertions (i.e., in 
Smith’s words, as ‘the annual produce of the land and labour of the society’) it is 
generally unclear whether this term refers a) to final goods or to final plus 
instrumental goods, or b) to any of these two sets of goods at an instant or in a 
period of time. These questions will be dealt with, respectively, in the current and 
following sections. 
It should be noted, to begin with, that, in spite of the many passages where Smith 
argues that money makes no part ‘like all other instruments of trade’ of the revenue 
of the society to which it belongs, he states in an isolated passage of Bk.I, Ch.XI of 
the Wealth of Nations that “land [an instrument of production] constitutes by far the 
greatest, the most important, and the most durable part of the wealth of every 
extensive country”. Since, however, the term ‘revenue’ is repeatedly used by Smith 
as synonymous with wealth (with the result that land cannot be said to be part of the 
wealth of any country for the same reason why it cannot be said to be part of its 
revenue), his statement on land cannot be but a misleading synthesis of two 
alternative sentences. These sentences may be put as follows: a) ‘the greatest, the 
most important, and the most durable part of the source of wealth of every extensive 
country’; and b) ‘the greatest, the most important, and the most durable part of the 
wealth of individuals in every extensive country’. 
If Smith’s statement on land were split into, or interpreted according to, these two 
sentences its initial ambiguity would disappear. For one thing is the wealth of society; 
another the wealth of an individual. While in the case of an individual (which 
corresponds to sentence b above) wealth may well consist of (the possession of) 
land as much as of money and other ‘instruments of trade’, in the case of the wealth 
of society (which corresponds to sentence a) wealth rather appears as the 
‘necessaries, conveniences and amusements of human life’ (final goods) available in 
a period of time. These necessaries etc. are said elsewhere to be “the sole end and 
purpose both of the fixed and the circulating capitals” (Smith, 1776, Bk.II, Ch.I, p.) 
and may be said, therefore and with a stronger reason, to be the sole end and 
purpose of ‘land’ itself (as an instrument of production). This implies that all 
instruments (of trade or production) can be regarded as wealth only in the ellyptic 
sense of being sources of wealth or, to put it in terms that will become fashionable 
later on, only in so far as they are indirect or intermediate  or inchoate wealth 
(Taussig, 1896); or, to put it in even more different terms, only in so far as they are 
wealth to come. 
That the wealth of the whole society is made up of final goods and that Smith is 
not inconsistent when he considers it as synonymous with national revenue is 
highlighted by the fact (noted by Max, Capital, Volume 2, Ch.19) that the term 
revenue, coming from the past participle revenu of the French verb revenir, denotes 
in itself something that returns. Unlike the term wealth, therefore, the term revenue is 
strictly connected with the idea of the reproduction of the ‘necessaries, conveniences 
and amusements of human life’ (whether this does or does not require the production 
of intermediate wealth), namely with the notion that the necessaries etc. which are 
available in a country this year (and thus constitute the wealth of this year) are the 
direct or indirect outcome of the necessaries etc. (wages fund) which were 
exchanged for, and consumed by, the labour employed in past years. 
In this connection it may be added that the idea of revenue need not coincide with 
the very idea of income. For, if revenue denotes what returns, income more simply 
denotes what comes in. It may indeed be indifferent, from the point of view of an 
individual, whether the goods he receives this year are returning to him as a revenue, 
or simply coming to him as an income. And, since this may be even more indifferent 
to the taxman, it may well be that the notion of (individual) income was developed in 
political economy when the theory and practice of taxation (of income) became more 
fashionable than the old classical, and more general, doctrine of reproduction (of 
wealth). From the point of view of society, however, the story is quite different -and 
has remained so even after classical economics went out of fashion. For, unless it 
consists only of richesses naturelles, the wealth of society must be annually 
reproduced before being subdivided between, and consumed by, its individual 
members as wages, profits and rents. 
 
STOCKS VS. FLOWS 
Whether the goods constituting wealth are considered at an instant or in a period 
of time is a question that can in turn be settled in the light of the distinction between 
the wealth of an individual and the wealth of the whole society (Pasinetti, 1977). The 
repeated use of the term ‘annual’ in the passages where Smith deals with these 
concepts indicates by itself that the goods referred to by his expression ‘wealth or 
revenue’ are to be considered in a period of time. On the other hand, since the 
wealth of an individual may well consist (as shown above) of (the possession of) 
goods that exist at an instant of time, the wealth that is said to be ‘annual’ cannot be 
but the wealth (revenue) of society. And since the general aim of Smith and many 
other classics was to study the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, it follows 
with a stronger reason that the focus of their analysis was (the increase of) the flow 
of final goods available in a period (and made possible by using up the intermediate 
goods inherited from a previous period) rather than the stock, however formed, of 
instrumental goods (let alone the value of this stock) owned by individuals at an 
instant of time (assets). 
It is no chance, therefore, that when a subsequent generation of economists 
focused their attention on the wealth of individuals it was the notion of wealth as a 
stock of goods owned, in any form and for whatever reasons, at an instant of time 
that was brought to the forefront of economic analysis. The author who perfected this 
change of attitude was Irving Fisher (1906). The meaning of the term wealth was 
accordingly reformulated, first, in the sense that wealth was defined as “material 
objects owned by human beings” and, secondly, in the sense that the income of an 
individual was said to consist of the services (a flow) provided by (or expected from) 
the wealth (a stock) owned by this individual at an instant of time (1906, Ch. XIII). 
Hence Fisher’s new concept of capital (which is defined in this new context as “a 
stock of wealth existing at an instant of time” and, therefore, as everything but the 
wages fund of the classics) and his development of the concept of capital value 
(Meacci, 1989). This concept, which was not unknown to Smith (1776, Bk.V, Ch.II, 
Pt.II, Arts.I & II, App.), is defined in detail by Fisher as the net present value 
(calculated according to the principles of discounting) of the future income stream (or 
cash flows) expected from the stock of wealth owned by an individual in any form at 
an instant of time. 
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